literature by the author, his collaborators and a host of others. In many ways, the arrangement of material is more like that of a web site than that of a traditional book. Collectively, however, the examples and problems, many of which will serve as examples for readers who flip between Parts I and II, are an impressive demonstration of the power and scope of game theory. I especially liked the analysis of markets as disciplining devices (section 3.20) .
Throughout the book and in keeping with idea 1, the author provides 'just enough in the way of definitions, concepts, theorems, and examples to begin solving problems'. Instructors will like that. They will also like how easily the text invites reaction and further discussion. For example, if 'the sex ratio game in §4.17 is not an evolutionary game, strictly speaking' but 'has a payoff structure like an evolutionary game ' (pp. 153-154) , so that 'playing the field' (Maynard Smith 1982, pp. 23-27) is (strictly speaking) excluded from consideration, then is the definition of evolutionary game not too restrictive? In the context of the public goods game in section 11.8, is it really so clear a priori that 'if it is worthwhile for an agent to cooperate in a bad period, it is worthwhile to cooperate in a good period' (pp. 273-274)? It would not be true in general if one allowed for cooperation via mutualism (Mesterton-Gibbons 2000, pp. 215-216), although in this case the author does not (because he supposes, for simplicity, that the threat to the community does not affect the benefit or cost to an individual). And so on. All of the above will be music to an instructor's ears. But there's a trade-off: what is just enough for a formal course may be too little for independent study. In particular, although the author rightly emphasizes agent-based simulation and presents several cogent examples of it, he offers no guidelines for those who wish to learn about agent-based simulation for themselves, such as, for example, Axelrod (1997) provided towards the end of his most recent monograph. So when the back cover announces that 'This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences', I wholeheartedly endorse the first claim, but I have reservations about the second.
I also have reservations about the value in a work on game theory of asserting that 'it is not plausible to model human sociality based on self-interested behaviour alone' (page 238). The author interprets his remark as follows: 'I use the term ''self-interested'' to mean self-regarding. Selfregarding agents evaluate alternative states of the world by considering only their impact on themselves, narrowly construed' (page 243).
In section 11.5, Gintis is able to characterize the 'salient behaviors' observed in some kinds of experimental game (ultimatum and public goods games) as strategic equilibria for Homo egualis by adding an 'other-regarding' utility of fairness to a 'self-regarding' utility of money for each player. But all of game theory, including the concept of equilibrium, is still predicated, all things considered, on rewards to individuals, and the first definition of self-interest in all of my dictionaries is personal advantage (or an equivalent phrase). In this sense, game theory is predicated on self-interest, which may be self-regarding, other-regarding or both, and not necessarily in an additive way. Furthermore, this is the sense that even the author appears to have in mind, earlier in the book, when he uses the phrase 'self-interest in disguise' (page 155). Is he just being tricky for the sake of being tricky? Perhaps: 'If there are boring and quirky ways to formulate a game,' he reveals up front, 'I prefer the quirky'.
What it all goes to show is that this is a wonderfully provocative book, which succeeds most admirably in its primary objective of serving as the text for a course on game theory. For those who are not economists, or who are not taking a course, the book may have drawbacks as an introductory text but will be valuable as a work of reference none the less. In it you will find an informed and incisive critique, a miscellany of models, pointers to much of the relevant literature and numerous insights on how an accomplished economist thinks about evolutionary game theory. There is often an idiosyncratic turn, but never a dull moment. Above all else, the author conveys a sense of excitement about the future of game theory: clearly, one thing he isn't is bored. Which recalls (out of context) a remark from Donald McCloskey's (1994) masterpiece of erudition and wit on interpreting economic (and other) science: 'Game theory is beginning (for the third time in its brief history) to bore economists; evolutionary theory stands enticingly ready to fuel careers and then to be abandoned in its turn' (page 141).
Would you like to be convinced that McCloskey is wrong (on this one particular point)? Then all you need do is read Game Theory Evolving.
